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Abstract:  
Can inertia in terminating unsuccessful loans be due to the multiplicity of lenders in 
loan arrangements? Can a lender reschedule, betting against his odds? We show 
that fear of being last in a liquidation run prevents the aggregation of the lenders’ 
information about the value of continuation. Private information in the form of  bad but 
coarse news, that would prompt foreclosure on its own, will instead lead to 
rescheduling. The gamble is that other lenders may have sharper information. At 
equilibrium, rescheduling occurs even if all lenders received bad news. This is 
inefficient (increasing the cost of capital) compared to perfect information sharing. 
However, from a social point of view, barren information sharing, the equilibrium does 
not exhibit excessive reliance on the information of others. 
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1 Introduction
Large defaults and bankruptcies, whether by rms or sovereign debtors, at-
tract the attention of both media and experts, with the media often wonder-
ing why the debtor was allowed to accumulate such huge liabilities. After
any default event, hindsight trivially reveals that too muchmoney was
invested or that the debtor was stopped too late. Notwithstanding the ob-
vious problem of perspective, non-experts often reproach banks of excessive
passivity towards borrowers. The suggestion is that, aware of the dangers,
they did not wish to act accordingly.
As briey discussed below, the literature provides several reasons why
lenders may fail either to gather su¢ cient information initially or to exert
e¢ cient monitoring of a debtors behavior later on. We consider a related but
di¤erent issue. We analyze whether a lender with bad news about an ongoing
loan may willingly ignore what he knows, ine¢ ciently delaying the liquidation
of bad projects or the bankruptcy of insolvent debtors. The problem we
address is not, therefore, whether lenders acquire su¢ cient information but
whether they e¢ ciently use information already in their possession.
Loosely speaking, it is perhaps not unreasonable for a lender with a foggy
view of the borrowers current prole to think twicebefore going for liq-
uidation, considering that such a decision cannot easily be undone later on.
To wait and see can be attractive, particularly if the loan arrangement
is with multiple lenders. Every single lender knows that others also receive
information about the borrowers prospects. It is then tempting to gam-
ble that other lenders may have obtained more precise information and may
therefore be in a better position to decide. Can this be rational? And what
if all lenders decide to reschedule their loans? Is there too much relying on
the possibility of others being better informed? Does this imply that there
is excessive rescheduling at equilibrium?
We provide an explanation for lender passivity based on (i) the presence
of multiple lenders in the loan arrangement, (ii) the information asymmetry
between lenders. The rst point draws on the observation that large loans
usually involve many lenders. The second introduces a so far neglected form
of asymmetry: the asymmetry in information precision. This will prove to
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be a key element of our story.
To characterize the game played in a multiple-lender loan, consider that,
when a borrower gets in trouble, a lender who does not renew his loan is likely
to trigger liquidation. Liquidation has two crucial attributes: irreversibil-
ity and strong complementarity. By irreversibility we mean that, once
a project is liquidated or a borrower led to bankruptcy, additional nanc-
ing can usually not be obtained. The value to be shared among the parties
is accordingly xed, i.e., independent of the actions they may subsequently
take.1 By strong complementaritywe mean that if one lender goes for it,
liquidation occurs for all lenders, completely determining their payo¤s.
The ine¢ ciencies that arise in the presence of multiple lenders are well
known. The literature has attempted to explain multiple lending arrange-
ments as a response to problems of asymmetric information or other imper-
fections in the loan market. Papers in this vein include Bolton and Scharf-
stein (1996), Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Detragiache, Garella
and Guiso (2000) and, more related to the present framework, Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995). The presence of multiple lenders in recontracting of
loan arrangements may lead to a lack of coordination, or to free riding, that
prevents socially optimal debt restructuring (Detragiache, 1994, Hart and
Moore, 1995, Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996, Detragiache and Garella, 1996).
However, making renegotiation di¢ cult may also act as a device to correct for
borrowersincentives to use funds in suboptimal ways, e.g., by undertaking
socially ine¢ cient projects (Hart and Moore, 1995).
Having more than one lender dilutes the incentives to monitor the bor-
rower, counterbalancing the discipline e¤ect. Dewatripont andMaskin (1995)
develop a setup where (i) initial debt is signed with one lender only, (ii) due
to limited fund availability, renancing involves a second lender. They show
that the incentives to monitor by the rst lender are reduced by the need to
involve a second lender, who will appropriate part of the generated gains. As
a result, less monitoring may bring forth less renancing at the intermedi-
ate stage, inducing a virtuous self-selection of borrowers at the initial date,
1Of course this simplication cuts away a branch of the game tree describing the liqui-
dation process. This way to proceed is common in the literature. An exception is Guiso
and Minetti (2006).
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favoring more e¢ cient assignment of funds. It is shown that this correction
would disappear if credit were to be provided by a centralized agency.
Minetti and Guiso (2004) and Minetti (2203) study a setup that shares
some assumptions with the present paper: multiple lenders arrangements in-
volve banks that are either relationship banks or transaction banks, where
relationship banks have better information about the borrower than trans-
action banks do. Furthermore, they assume that relationship banks, thanks
to their superior information, have the advantage that they can selectively
choose which assets to repossess in a liquidation.2 Our paper shares with
Minetti and Guiso (2004) the idea that lenders receive private information
that can di¤er in precision.
We analyze a simple recontracting game involving one (large) borrower
and two creditors. The project nanced at date 0 has one period duration. At
the end of the period, with probability less than one, the project is successful
and delivers a given return. Otherwise, the project does not deliver any cash
ow at date 1. In this state, if allowed to continue one additional period, the
project will yield a stochastic nal payo¤. This can be smaller or larger than
the date 1 liquidation value, but the unconditional expected value is smaller.
However, each lender observes an exogenous private signal about the value
of the loan returns at date 2. Conditional on this information, each lender
independently decides wether to reschedule his loan or to foreclose. The
signals received can be of two types: precise or coarse. Information received
at the rescheduling stage could in principle be merged. However, as we shall
show, a communication game will in general fail to provide equilibria where
truthful revelation of information occurs, so that information is not merged.
Accordingly, decisions wether to reschedule must be taken based only upon
the privately received signals.3
2Related to this issue, Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) empirically test various hy-
potheses about the role of relationship vs. arms-length loans in Argentina.
3Other reasons may prevent information to be merged. Guiso and Minetti (2004)
argue that the borrower can selectively control the information ows. We can also think
of cases where lenders have private interests with large rms, for instance when they also
nance suppliers of these rms, or when they can buy or sell outstanding bonds issued by
the borrower. In both cases the lenders have incentives to manipulate the revelation of
information.
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Strikingly, if a bank receives unfavorable but coarse information, that
would unambiguously trigger liquidation if the bank were the sole lender,
it will not do so at equilibrium when another lender is involved. Indeed,
when the likelihood that the other lender is well informed is su¢ ciently large,
rescheduling by a coarsely informed bank is a dominant strategy. When both
banks receive the coarse signal, they therefore both ignore it and reschedule
instead of liquidating. In other words, both banks behave as if they had
received favorable information. Such behavior, that external observers would
presumably describe as unwise, arises out of equilibrium strategies enacted
by rational players. Obviously, the use of information is then not socially
optimal compared to a situation where information is merged. Nevertheless,
we show that the equilibrium could not be improved upon by a social planner
who could direct the banksactions, but subject to the same information
structure. In this sense, given the informational constraints, there is no
excessive rescheduling at equilibrium.4
Lenders in our game have interests that are not fully conicting: if some
good information is around, every lender is better o¤ by rescheduling rather
than liquidating. Key to the decision to reschedule by an ill informed lender
is therefore the strong complementarityof liquidation: if the other bank
is well informed, it will trigger liquidation when it is optimal to do so. Of
course, and paradoxically, when both lenders are ill informed they both rely
on this likelihood and ine¢ cient rescheduling occurs.
In an appendix, we discuss the case where the two banks are treated
asymmetrically under liquidation, in the sense that if one triggers liquida-
tion while the other reschedules, the rst gets a higher payo¤than the second.
A lender receiving the precise signal will then liquidate excessively. This oc-
curs because there is a chance that the other bank is not fully informed and
liquidates. Therefore, our model also allows for ine¢ cient equilibrium runs
on the borrowers assets on the part of well informed lenders, triggered by
the rst mover advantage . The e¤ective path of play in this context bad
news ignored and excessive passivity, or good news ignored and excessive
liquidation, or e¢ cient decisions depends upon how Nature distributes in-
4To be precise, some situations may exhibit multiple equilibria, some of which are
ine¢ cient in the second-best sense described above.
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formation across lenders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section
3 we derive the equilibrium strategies. We make the simplifying assumption
that banks are treated symmetrically in a liquidation, thereby ensuring that
a well informed bank always takes the socially e¢ cient decision. This allows
us to focus on the strategic aspects related to the ill informed bank relying
on the information of the other lender. Section 4 deals with the e¢ ciency
properties of the equilibria. Section 5 discusses the limits to information
sharing between banks that justify why information is not merged in our non-
cooperative game. Section 6 extends the results to a game where lenders move
in sequence, so that a rescheduling decision by the rst mover is observable
by the second. Section 7 concludes. The appendix analyzes the game with a
rst-mover advantage in liquidation.
2 The model
There are three periods, an entrepreneur with no endowment, and lenders.
At date 0, the entrepreneur seeks nancing for a project. Two lenders, hence-
forth the banks, participate in equal measure to the provision of funds by
means of debt contracts. Banks are small or the project is large, so that
nancing must be obtained from two lenders. The amount to be raised from
each bank is normalized to 1. For each loan, the face value of the repay-
ment is B  1 and a bank receives this full amount if everything goes well.
The credit market is competitive and lenders earn zero expected prot at
equilibrium. To simplify, the opportunity cost of funds is zero.
With probability  the project is successful. It is then completed by date
1 yielding a return that is su¢ ciently large to cover repayment of debt. With
probability 1 , the project runs into problems and the loans cannot be paid
back at date 1 as scheduled. A creditor then has two options. He can either
foreclose on his loan or roll it over. Each loan is secured on collateral whose
date 1 liquidation value is L < 1 when both banks foreclose. Rescheduling
by both banks allows the project to continue. Continuation yields each bank
the random return eX at date 2, where eX is distributed over the interval
5
[0; 1] with cumulative distribution function F (X).5 The expected return
from continuation is denoted by X. We assume X < L: from a collective
standpoint, it is best to liquidate at date 1 unless information to the contrary
becomes available.
An unsuccessful project continues up to date 2 only if both banks resched-
ule their loan. Banks do not coordinate, for reasons to be explained below.
When one bank reschedules and the other forecloses, the latter obtains L+ "
and the former L   ", where 0  " < L. Foreclosing by one bank disrupts
the project, ultimately entailing liquidation, and " > 0 is the rst-mover
advantage in a run on the rms assets. The parameter " depends on fore-
closing costs or on the overlap between collateral. Alternatively, it reects
lendersexpectations about the advantage given to rst movers by the legal
and institutional setting.
At date 1, prior to the rescheduling decision, each bank independently
obtains information about the value of continuation. The signal about eX
can be of two possible types: it is either the precise signal eSp or the coarse
signal eSc. The precise signal is more informative in the sense that, for any
realizations Sp and Sc, the conditional expectation about the value of con-
tinuation satises E( eX j Sp; Sc) = E( eX j Sp), i.e., the coarse signal adds
nothing to the precise signal in terms of information content. With proba-
bility  a bank observes the precise signal, with probability 1   it observes
the coarse one.
A bank does not know the content nor the type of signal received by
the other bank, but it knows the probabilities with which sharp or coarse
information is obtained. Moreover, the information received by the banks is
non veriable or soft. In particular, a bank observing Sp may announce that
the value of continuation is E( eX j Sp) > L, but it can o¤er no proof even
if the announcement is true. Thus, any exchange of information at date 1 is
cheap talk. The consequence is that information will not be shared because
of the rst-mover advantage in a liquidation run. We discuss further the
limits to (non-cooperative) information aggregation between the two lenders
in Section 5.
5Since banks have equal share and the total return is less than the total faced value of
debt, they share the return equally.
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Accordingly, in the basic model, the banks act independently and simul-
taneously on the basis of the information each has received. The situation
we have in mind is one where it is part of an equilibrium for the coarsely in-
formed bank to disregard unfavorable information, i.e., the bank reschedules
even though E( eX j Sc) < L. Intuitively, this requires that eSp be su¢ ciently
more informative than eSc and that the probability  of the other bank being
better informed be su¢ ciently large. To make our point in as simple a set-up
as possible, we therefore assume that the precise signal is in fact perfectly
informative, i.e., Sp = X, while the coarse signal is totally uninformative,
which we write as Sc = . Observing the coarse signal is consequently al-
ways unfavorable since E( eX j ) = X < L. The next section analyzes the
rescheduling game.
3 Rescheduling decisions
To simplify the exposition further, we now assume that the rst-mover ad-
vantage in foreclosure is close to zero. In e¤ect, we will write all payo¤s as
if " = 0. By continuity, the actual equilibrium will be close to what we com-
pute, but encumbered by second orderterms. With " arbitrarily close to
zero, when one bank reschedules and the other forecloses, the payo¤s simplify
to L for each bank. In Appendix 2, we derive the banksstrategies when "
di¤ers from zero and discuss how this a¤ects the equilibrium outcome.
Let liq and res refer to liquidateand reschedule. Strategies are de-
noted by , the probability that a bank plays liq. We write (X) for the
strategy played by a well informed bank which learns X; similarly, () is
the strategy played when ill informed. A banks expected payo¤ is denoted
by u.6 Given the simplication that the rst-mover advantage is arbitrar-
ily small, bank is expected payo¤ from playing liq does not depend on its
information nor on bank js strategy (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j). Thus,
ui(liq; j j ) = ui(liq; j j X) = L; for all X: (1)
This is not so for the expected payo¤ from playing res. If bank i is informed,
6While this section describes the Bayesian equilibria for the simultaneous game, we
introduce a sequence in section 6. The equilibrium concept is then Perfect Bayesian.
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its expected payo¤ is
ui(res; j jX) =
(1 ) [j()L+ (1 j())X] +  [j(X)L+ (1 j(X))X] : (2)
If it is ill-informed, the expected payo¤ from res is
ui(res; j j) =
E f(1 )[j()L+ (1 j())X]+[j(X)L+ (1 j(X))X]g: (3)
In the last two equations,  is the probability that bank j is well informed.
The di¤erence between (2) and (3) is the expectation operator in the latter,
since the bank whose payo¤ is represented in (3) does not know X. Compar-
ing (1) and (2), the best strategy of an informed bank is obviously to choose
liq if L > X and res otherwise. At equilibrium, therefore, for either bank,
i(X) =

1 if X < L;
0 if X  L: (4)
Note that this coincides with the socially optimal decision.
To derive the best response of an ill informed bank, dene Z = max[X;L].
This is the total return that would accrue from an unsuccessful project if
banks were perfectly informed at date 1 and took the appropriate decision.
The expected value is
Z  E(Z) = F (L)L+ (1  F (L))E (X j X  L) : (5)
Substituting in (3) and using (4), the payo¤ from res for an ill informed bank
can then be rewritten as
ui(res; j j ) =
(1  ) j()L+ (1  ())X+ Z: (6)
Comparing (1) and (6), bank is best response, when ill informed, depends
on the other banks strategy when the latter is also ill informed and on the
likelihood of poor information. The expression in (6) is increasing in  since
Z > L > X. Accordingly, if  is su¢ ciently large, it is best to play res and
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rely on the other bank to make the appropriate decision. Conversely, if 
is close to zero, the best move is to play liq. The expression in (6) is also
increasing in j(). The greater the probability that the other bank plays liq
when ill informed, the safer it is to play res when one is also ill informed since
the probability of a wrongrescheduling decision is smaller. It is possible
to associate the equilibrium behavior of ill informed banks to the value taken
by .
Proposition 1 At equilibrium, for " = 0, well informed banks take the so-
cially optimal decisions as in (4). Ill informed ones always reschedule their
loan if
  b  L X
Z  X : (7)
When  < b, there are two equilibria. In the symmetric equilibrium M , ill
informed banks play a mixed strategy, rescheduling with the strictly positive
probability
1  i() = 
1  

Z   L
L X

; i = 1; 2: (8)
In the asymmetric equilibrium P , ill informed banks play pure strategies: one
always reschedules, the other always liquidates.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The essence of the result is that banks sometimes rely on others to take
the appropriate decision. The gamble, from the perspective of an ill informed
bank, is that the other lender may have more precise information. When this
is su¢ ciently likely (i.e.,   b), each bank, when ill informed, completely
disregards its own unfavorable information and relies fully on the other bank
to be better informed. In fact, temporizingthrough a rescheduling decision
is then a dominant strategy see the proof.
When the likelihood of the other bank being well informed is small ( < b),
there are two possibilities. In the pure strategy equilibrium P , one bank is
passive and delegatesto the other lender the liquidation versus reschedul-
ing decision. In turn, the lender in charge always forecloses when ill informed,
completely discounting the possibility that the other bank may have obtained
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favorable information.7 In the symmetric strategy equilibrium M , an ill in-
formed bank is indi¤erent between rescheduling or foreclosing. The greater
the likelihood that the other bank is well informed, the larger the probability
of rescheduling, i.e., of relying on the decision to the other lender. The next
section discusses the extent of the ine¢ ciencies characterizing these equilib-
ria.
4 Ine¢ ciency
Ine¢ ciency compared to the rst-best with shared information is not sur-
prising. Still, it is of interest to explore how the nature and extent of the
ine¢ ciency is a¤ected by the amount of information in the system. Moreover,
while the perfect sharing of information represents an obvious benchmark,
we also ask whether the equilibria can be improved upon even though infor-
mation is not shared.
The facial value of each loan is B (i.e., B = 1 +  where  is the rate
of interest on the debt contract) and by assumption the value of a suc-
cessful project is su¢ ciently large to reimburse each lender. Let Y denote
the amount that each lender expects to recuperate from an unsuccessful
project i.e., one that will not be completed at date 1. Recall that a project
is successful with probability . In a perfectly competitive credit market,
banks earn zero ex ante expected prots so that B satises
B + (1  )Y = 1:
The larger Y , the smaller B (equivalently, the smaller ). We measure inef-
ciency by how small Y is.
In terms of the lenders strategies, and written as a function of , the
amount recuperated on average by each lender is
Y () = 2Z + (1  ) b2L+ (1  b2)Z+ (1  ) b1L+ (1  b1)Z
+ (1  )2 (1  (1  b1)(1  b2))L+ (1  b1)(1  b2)X ; (9)
7When " > 0 and is su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium P ceases to exist, although the
equilibrium in mixed strategies remains. For  small, the only pure strategy equilibrium
is then for both lenders to liquidate. This issue is briey discussed in the appendix.
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where bi is the strategy i() when ill informed. In the above expression,
each bank plays the socially optimal and equilibrium strategy when well
informed. The derivation of (9) is straightforward. The expected return Z
is obtained when both banks are well informed or when only one is, which
occurs with probability 2(1   ), and the other reschedules. When both
banks are ill informed, the total return from an unsuccessful project is L if
at least one bank liquidates, otherwise it is on average X.
In a rst best with perfectly aggregated information, the amount expected
to be recuperated is
Y

() = (1  )2 L+  1  (1  )2Z: (10)
When information is shared, Z is expected to be recuperated if at least one
of the lenders is informed, hence with probability 1   (1  )2. When none
is informed, the project is appropriately liquidated.
Denote the equilibrium outcome by Y
e
(). From proposition 1, when
  b,
Y
e
() = Y II()  (1  )2X +
 
1  (1  )2Z: (11)
The subscript in the middle expression emphasizes that in equilibrium both
lenders always reschedule; that is, we set b1 = b2 = 0 in (9). Note that Y II()
is always smaller than Y

(), provided  is not equal to one. This means that
ine¢ ciency with respect to the rst best arises out of bank passivity in case
 > b (the pure strategy equilibrium region where ill informed banks always
reschedule at unison).
When  < b, the outcome depends on which equilibrium we pick. In the
pure strategy equilibrium, when both banks are ill informed, one reschedules
and the other liquidates. Hence,
Y
e
() = Y P ()  (1  )L+ Z: (12)
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, both lenders play the same strategy and
Y
e
() = Y M()  2Z + 2(1  )
bL+ (1  b)Z
+ (1  )2  1  (1  b)2L+ (1  b)2X ; (13)
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where b is the optimal strategy () dened in proposition 1. Observe that
for  = 0 one has b = 1 and hence Y e() = Y e() = Y  = L, so that there is
no loss of e¢ ciency with respect to the rst best. The same holds if  = 1.
Comparing with the rst-best amount in (10), therefore, one can see that
Y
e
()  Y (), with strict inequality when  2 (0; 1). There is maximum
waste of information when the probability that individual banks are well
informed is neither too large nor too small. When the information is on
average either very good ( close to unity) or very bad ( close to zero), the
social loss from the non sharing of information is negligible. Relying on the
other bank to be well informed has no social cost if indeed the other bank is
very likely to be informed. Conversely, when the likelihood is small, at least
one bank will almost be certain to liquidate this is the bank in charge
in equilibrium P or both banks in equilibrium M , since () in (8) then
approaches unity.
Consider now the nature of the ine¢ ciency. When   b, ill informed
banks always reschedule. Rescheduling may therefore occur even though
both banks have unfavorable albeit imprecise information. Compared to
the rst best, the problem is therefore too much rescheduling. By contrast,
when  < b, ine¢ cient rescheduling never occurs in the pure strategy equi-
librium, but there is ine¢ cient liquidation. The bank in chargemay then
foreclose even though the other lender observedX  L. In the mixed strategy
equilibrium, both types of ine¢ ciencies occur. Which of these two equilibria
is socially preferable? In the proof of the next proposition, we show that
the pure strategy equilibrium is socially preferable, i.e., Y P () > Y M() for
 2 (0;b).
Amore general question is whether a Pareto improvement could be achieved
by imposing rescheduling strategies on banks, subject to the constraint that
they are consistent with the banksprivate information. Second-best optimal
strategies potentially di¤er from the equilibrium ones only in the event that
banks are ill informed. To characterize the socially optimal strategies, it is
therefore su¢ cient to choose b1 and b2 in (9) so as to maximize Y ().
Proposition 2 The following strategies are second-best optimal, subject to
the constraint that lenders cannot credibly share information: if   b, b1 =b2 = 0; if  < b, b1 = 1 and b2 = 0 or b1 = 0 and b2 = 1.
12
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result is surprising. When lenders obtain information that cannot
be shared and if the likelihood of information is su¢ ciently high (  b),
there is indeed excessive rescheduling compared to the ideal of perfectly ag-
gregated information. However, given the constraint that information cannot
be shared, rescheduling decisions are socially optimal in a second-best sense.
Put di¤erently, in equilibrium, there is not excessive reliance on others be-
ing well informed. For instance, the outcome would be worse if ill informed
banks always acted myopically, foreclosing on the basis of the imprecise but
unfavorable information .8 When  < b, the pure strategy equilibrium is
second-best e¢ cient. It is socially e¢ cient for the bank in charge to act
myopically at the risk of ine¢ cient liquidation and for one bank to fully
rely on the other lenders decision. Ine¢ cient rescheduling in a second-best
sense therefore only arises in the mixed strategy equilibrium, which requires
a su¢ ciently small probability of banks being well informed.
5 Limits to information sharing
To show that banks cannot credibly communicate in our set-up, we expand
the set of actions at date 1 to allow for a communication game. One can
imagine that, prior to the play of the rescheduling decisions, banks make
announcements, mi, of the form mi = X^ or mi = , after which they play
rescheduleor liquidateas described above (alternatively, the banks could
announce their intention to play reschedule or liquidate). Banks have
conicting interests when there is a rst-mover advantage to the bank which
forecloses while the other reschedules: the former gets L+", the latter L   ".
The following result justies the analysis of the full game under the assump-
tion that no communication between banks is possible.
Lemma 1 If a communication game is played at date 1, it is a dominant
strategy to announce mi = X^ such that X^  L+ ".
8We would then have Y () = (1   2)L + 2Z, which is easily seen to be less than
Y II() when   b.
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The result is obvious. If a bank indeed learnedX satisfying the inequality,
it would like to convince the other bank that continuation is protable for
both of them. However, a bank learning X such that X < L   " would
also gain from making the same announcement if it were believed (which
requires that the other is ill informed), since it would be the rst mover in
liquidation. Similarly, a bank learning  cannot gain by announcing that it
received a poor but unfavorable signal. For instance, suppose the two banks
are ill informed and that each truthfully announces , prompting liquidation
at the next stage. Then one bank would have been better o¤ announcing a
favorable X and be the rst mover should the announcement be believed.
Thus, in equilibrium, favorable announcements will never be believed and
will be equivalent to being told nothing. In the terminology of cheap-talk
games, announcements are neither self-committing nor self-signaling, hence
are not credible (see Farell and Rabin, 1996).
One objection to the infeasibility of credible communication is the pos-
sibility, contrary to what we assumed, that a lender could commit su¢ cient
funds to buy out the other lenders claim. A lender with favorable infor-
mation would make an o¤er, with a commitment to execution, that could
signal his information. Leaving aside the problem of ensuring commitment
to such an o¤er, it would nevertheless still be the case that information is not
e¢ ciently shared. The problem is that banks are asymmetrically informed
and each one wants to sell high or purchase cheap.9
To illustrate, suppose o¤ers to buy out the other banks loan can be
modeled as a second-price auction. Each bank announces a price b at which
it would be ready to sell its claim and up to which it would be willing to buy
out the other. If bj > bi, the bank with bid bj purchases the other banks
loan for a price equal to bi. Both loans therefore end up in the hands of a
single lender, who then makes the decision regarding rescheduling (if there
is a tie, a coin is ipped to pick the winner). If bids reected true values
conditional on each banks private information, an ill informed bank would
bid b() = L and a well informed bank b(X) = max(L;X). Such bids would
reveal all relevant information and rescheduling decisions would therefore be
9This is a variant of the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) impossibility result for
bilateral trading games.
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e¢ cient. However, it is easily seen that the above bidding strategies cannot
be part of an equilibrium.
Consider an ill informed bank which expects the other lender to play
according to the above strategies. Bididng b < L is clearly a dominated
strategy, while the expected net payo¤ from bidding b > L is
[1   + F (L)]L+ 
bR
L
Xf(X) dX + (1  F (b))b (14)
The expression in brackets is the probability that the other lender bids L,
either because he is ill informed or is well informed but X  L. In this case,
a bid b > L wins the auction and the winner obtains assets, which can be
infered to be worth 2L and for which a price L is paid. The second term
is the expected gain against an informed player whose bid is above L but
below b (the buyer infers that the assets are worth 2X, for which X is paid).
The third term is the payo¤ from losing the auction and selling ones claim
at price b. It is easily checked that the above expression is strictly increasing
in b in a neighborhood of b = L. An ill-informed player expecting the other
player to bid truthfullywould therefore want to overbid.
It can be shown that the equilibrium of this bidding game involves mixed
strategies, with overbidding, both for an ill informed and a well informed
lender. Hence, information will not be perfectly shared and the winner of
the bidding game will still make ine¢ cient rescheduling decisions.10
6 Herding
Our results bear some similarity with so-called herding phenomena. How-
ever, the mechanism leading to a wrongoutcome with herding is of a very
di¤erent nature. Herding (see for instance Banerjee 1992) occurs when play-
ers who receive private signals observe the actions taken by other players
and update accordingly. In such a setup, the rst player, so to speak, can
determine a cascade of optimal deviations from the actions dictated by the
10Overbidding occurs in equilibrium as in Burkart (1995), but in the context of a
common-value auction as in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983).
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private signals, even when the information received by players, if merged,
would point towards a superior solution.
In our case, observing other playersactions is inessential. An ill informed
bank knows that, if it reschedules, its mistake can be corrected by the better
informed lender, when there is one, but not if it forecloses. This su¢ ces to
gamble against information that is unfavorable but poor. Indeed, modifying
our set-up so as to introduce a sequence of moves has no e¤ect on the results.
Suppose one bank, say bank 1, moves rst. Denote its strategy by b1()
where the dot refers to the banks private information. Bank 2 moves after
observing the action of bank 1. Its strategy is described by b2(liq; ) andb2(res; ), where again the dot is the banks private information and where
liq and res refer to bank 1s action. We have the following result.
Proposition 3 Let 1() and 2() be equilibrium strategies of the simultane-
ous game, where the argument is  or the realization of eX. Then b1() = 1()
and b2(liq; ) = 1, b2(res; ) = 2() are equilibrium strategies of the sequen-
tial game where bank 1s play of res or liq is observed by bank 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Bank 2 is now better informed than when moves are simultaneous, but
the outcome is not improved. The intuition is that bank 2s action matters
only when bank 1 plays res, as in the simultaneous game. If bank 2 is well
informed, it chooses the socially e¢ cient action, again as in the simultaneous
game. In one class of equilibria, an ill informed bank 2 replicates res because
the play of res by bank 1 represents good news.11 Thus, an ill informed
bank 2 plays res when its decision matters. For bank 1, the play of res
therefore has the same expected payo¤ as in the simultaneous game.
7 Concluding comments
The notion that loan arrangements may result in excessive lending is not
new. This takes di¤erent forms depending on the context. The nancing of
11Rescheduling by bank 1 is good news if  is large, since the possibility that the bank
rescheduled even though ill informed is then small. It is also good news if  is small and
bank 1 plays res only when well informed.
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projects with negative expected present value (De Meza and Webb, 1987) or
the provision of loans that allow managers to pursue ine¢ cient projects in
the future (Hart and Moore, 1995) are just two examples. Overlending may
also result from imperfect bankruptcy procedures that give too much protec-
tion to borrowers. Similarly, ine¢ cient monitoring may hamper the ability to
make the e¢ cient nancing decisions. The idea explored in the present pa-
per is that ine¢ ciencies may arise at the rescheduling stage because lenders
rationally decide to disregard bad signals. There is excessive rescheduling in
the sense that ex post, were the information available to lenders revealed, it
could be veried that all lenders had bad news and all lenders nevertheless
decided to reschedule.
Our argument bears some similarity with so-called herding phenomena.
However, the similarity is only apparent: in our game the results do not
impinge upon a player observing the actions of other players. An ill informed
bank, because of the chain of events triggered by foreclosure, knows that its
mistake in rescheduling can be corrected by better informed lenders. This
su¢ ces to gamble against privately observed bad signals, provided the rst-
mover advantage in a liquidation run is not too large. Obviously, this depends
on whether loans are collateralized and more generally on the extent to which
creditor rights are protected.
In practice, foreclosing is a drastic decision only if creditor rights are
highly protected and repossession of the debtor assets is swift and frictionless.
This is not so in most industrialized countries and maybe even less so in less
developed ones. Prevailing codes ensure that debtor rights are preserved
under liquidation, or that debtors can appeal to special protection such as
Chapter 11 in the U.S., based on the idea that liquidation of viable rms may
occur due to market imperfections. This is clearly not the place to resume
the rich debate on the design of optimal creditors rights, liquidation and
bankruptcy. We point out, however, that a loans liquidation value in the
model should be interpreted as reecting the payment expected by a lender,
given the collateral arrangement, if any, and given the prevailing legislation
and e¢ ciency of the legal system.
There are other examples of games where players do not use all of the
information available to them. In Brandenburger and Polak (1996), managers
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maximize the value of the rms shares by taking the actions they would
take if their information did not di¤er from that of market participants.
The point is that managers choose suboptimal actions even though they
have superior information. The nance literature also deals with various
kinds of ine¢ cient management that tries to please analysts (see for instance
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999 and 2005, and the references therein).
In a voting context, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) analyze a game where
voters abstain if they are ill informed, for fear of being pivotal.
Appendix 1
Proof of proposition 1: From (1) and (6), when ill informed, bank i plays
res if
(1  ) j()L+ (1  j())X+ Z  L: (15)
Consider rst the case where   b as dened in the proposition. The above
condition is then satised with j() = 0. Moreover, the left-hand side of
(15) is increasing in j() because L > X. Hence, the condition holds for all
j(), which means that res is a dominant strategy for bank i. This proves
the rst part of the proposition. When  < b, condition (15) does not hold
if j() = 0. The best response to the pure strategy res is therefore the
pure strategy liq. Now, (15) is satised as a strict inequality if j() = 1
(since Z > L and given  > 0). Thus, res is itself the best response to liq,
proving equilibrium P . From this last argument, when 0 <  < b, there
exists j() 2 (0; 1) such that (15) holds as an equality. Solving for j()
yields (8) and proves equilibrium M .
Proof of proposition 2: The optimal 1 and 2 maximize Y () as dened
in (9). Let i be the multiplier associated with the constraint i  1 and i
the multiplier associated with i  0, i = 1; 2. The Lagrangian is
L = Y () + 1(1  1) + 11 + 2(1  2) + 22:
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The necessary conditions for a maximum are the Kuhn-Tucker rst-order
conditions
@L=@1 = (1 )[(1 )(L X)(1 2)  (Z L)]  1 + 1=0; (16)
@L=@2 = (1 )[(1 )(L X)(1 1)  (Z L)]  2 + 2=0; (17)
together with complementary slackness and non-negativity of the multipliers,
i(1  i) = ii = 0, i  0, i  0, i = 1; 2: (18)
When  > b, (1 )(L X)(1 i) (Z L) < 0 for all i. Hence, there
is only one solution to (16), (17) and (18) and it involves i > 0, implying
i = 0, i = 1; 2. We henceforth discuss the case  < b.
We rst discard the possibility of corner solutions of the form 1 = 2 = 0
or 1 = 2 = 1. Consider the rst possibility. With 1 = 2 = 0, the term in
brackets in (16) and (17) is positive since (1  )(L X)  (Z  L) > 0 for
 < b. The conditions are therefore satised only if 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, which
in turn implies 1 = 2 = 1, a contradiction. Similarly, noting that the term
in brackets is negative if 1 = 2 = 1, the conditions are then satised only
if 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, which implies 1 = 2 = 0, again a contradiction.
We now show that the conditions are satised by a corner solution of the
form 1 = 1 and 2 = 0. By the above argument, 2 = 0 in (16) implies
1 > 0 and therefore 1 = 1. In (17), 1 = 1 implies 2 > 0, hence 2 = 0.
There is therefore a corner solution, as stated, for appropriate values of 1
and 2. This corner solution corresponds to equilibrium P and it yields
Y P () as dened in (12).
Finally, it is easily seen that the term in brackets in (16) and (17) is
zero if 1 = 2 = (), where the latter is as dened in (8). Together with
i = i = 0, i = 1; 2, this therefore constitutes another possible solution to
the set of necessary conditions. Furthermore, it is the only interior solution.
It corresponds to equilibrium M and yields Y M().
To conclude the proof for the case  < b, we therefore need to compare
Y P () and Y M(). >From (8), substitute for b = () in (13) so that
Y M() = L+
2(Z   L)(Z  X)
(L X) :
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Dene
h()  Y M()  Y P () =

L+
2(Z   L)(Z  X)
(L X)

  (1  )L+ Z :
This function is a quadratic in , with roots at  = b = (L X)=(Z X) and
 = 0. The expression is also strictly convex, hence h() < 0 when  2 (0;b).
Thus, Y P () > Y M() and the optimum is the corner solution 1 = 1 and
2 = 0.
Proof of proposition 3: When bank 1 chooses liq, bank 2 cannot a¤ect
the outcome and it is therefore a best response to also choose liq, henceb2(liq; ) = 1. Obviously, b1(X) = b2(res;X) = (X), i.e., well informed
banks choose the socially e¢ cient action (when their action matters). Thus,
we need only discuss b1() and b2(res; ). In the simultaneous game (and
given that the other bank behaves e¢ ciently when well informed), bank 2
prefers res to liq if
(1  ) 1L+ (1  1))X+ Z  L; (19)
where 1 is short-hand for 1(). In the sequential game, after the play of
res by bank 1, res is preferred to liq by bank 2 if
(1  F (L))E(X j X  L) + (1  )(1  1)X
(1  F (L)) + (1  )(1  1)  L; (20)
where 1 is short-hand for b1(). The left-hand side is the expected payo¤
from playing res, given that bank 2 observed  and the play of res by bank 1
(the probability of the latter is the numerator of the expression). Now, from
(5), substitute for Z in (19), which then writes as
(1  ) 1L+ (1  1))X+  [(1  F (L))E(X j X  L) + F (L)L]  L:
(21)
It is easily checked that (20) and (21) are equivalent. Thus, b1() = 1()
implies b2(res; ) = 2() as best response. We now show the converse. In
the sequential game, when ill informed, bank 1 prefers res to liq if
(1  ) 2L+ (1  2))X+ Z  L; (22)
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where 2 is short-hand for b2(res; ). The condition is the same in the simul-
taneous game, but with 2 short-hand for 2(). It follows that b2(res; ) =
2() implies b1() = 1(), thereby concluding the proof.
Appendix 2
To complete the analysis, we briey explore the case where the rst-
mover advantage in liquidation is non negligible (we restrict the discussion
to the simultaneous game). Recall that, if it is the only one to foreclose, a
bank gets the payo¤ L + " while the other lender gets L   ". Compared to
the equilibrium where " is arbitrarily close to zero, a larger value has two
e¤ects. First, well informed banks will now ine¢ ciently foreclose unless their
information is su¢ ciently favorable. Secondly, ill informed banks foreclose
more often. Both e¤ects reinforce one another.
To see this, let X 0" denote the equilibrium cuto¤ such that an informed
bank reschedules when observing X  X 0". From a social point of view,
rescheduling should take place when X > L. However, with " greater than
zero, an informed bank will now foreclose if X is su¢ ciently close to L. One
reason is the possibility of gaining the rst-mover advantage should the other
lender reschedule. Another is that rescheduling is now dangerous as the other
lender might foreclose because he is ill informed. The payo¤ then would be
L   " rather than L as in section 3. At the same time, an ill informed
bank will anticipate that the other lender, if informed, will be less prone to
rescheduling. The strategy of an ill informed bank will therefore also change
and lean more towards foreclosure. At the extreme, if " is large enough, the
advantage from foreclosing is so large that it becomes a dominant strategy,
whatever the signal received.
Otherwise, when the value of " is not too large, equilibrium strategies are
similar to those already studied, except for the ine¢ cient liquidation when
at least one bank is well informed and the fact that ine¢ cient rescheduling
takes place less often when both banks are ill informed. In other words, the
rst-mover advantage in foreclosing remedies some of the excess rescheduling,
but at the cost of excessive liquidations.
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The frequency of ine¢ cient foreclosing increases with X 0". Let "() de-
note the probability of liquidation by an ill informed lender, as a function of ".
As shown at the end of this appendix, the threshold triggering rescheduling
for a well informed bank is then
X 0" = L+
(1  )"
1  "()(1  ) . (23)
As in section 3, an ill informed bank always reschedules if the probability of
the other bank being well informed is su¢ ciently large. Specically, "()
equals zero if
  b"  L+ " X
F (X 0")L+ (1  F (X 0"))E (X j X  X 0") X
 ; (24)
where X 0" = L+(1  )". It is easily veried that b" is increasing in ". When
 < b" but assuming it is not too small, an ill informed bank randomizes,
rescheduling with probability
1  "() =  [E(X j X  X
0
")  L] (1  F (X 0"))  "
(1  )(L  X) : (25)
It is easily shown that "() is larger than the corresponding value in propo-
sition 1. Note also that (25) holds only if  is not too small, otherwise the
expression becomes negative. Therefore, if  is su¢ ciently small, the equi-
librium is in pure strategies with "() = 1. This is a further contrast with
the equilibrium derived in section 3.
Proofs of the statements in Appendix 2: We rst derive the formula
for X 0" in (23). We write " = "() for short. If a well informed bank plays
res after observing X  X 0", its expected payo¤ is
X + (1  ) ["(L  ") + (1  ")X] ;
given that the other lender will also play res if informed. If the bank plays
liq, the expected payo¤ is
((1  )(1  ") + ) (L+ ") + (1  )"L:
22
For X 0" to dene a cuto¤ point, the two payo¤s must be equal at X = X
0
",
which leads to (23).
To prove (24), set " = 0 in (23) so that X 0" = L + (1   )". If it plays
res, an ill informed bank gets
u(res; " j) =  f(1  F (X 0"))E(X j X  X 0") + F (X 0")(L  ")g+ (1  )X:
If it plays liq, the expected payo¤ is
u(liq; " j) =  f(1  F (X 0")) (L+ ") + F (X 0")Lg+ (1  )(L+ "):
One easily checks that u(res;  j)  u(liq;  j) is equivalent to   b" as
dened in (24). Note that b" < 1 only if " is not too large, which is implicitly
assumed here.
To prove (25), assume  < b" and write  for the belief that an ill informed
bank assigns to the event that the other lender plays res. At equilibrium,
 = (1 F (X 0"))+(1 )(1 "). For an ill informed bank, the payo¤ from
liq is therefore
 (L+ ") + (1  )L:
The payo¤ from res is


(1  F (X 0"))

E(X j X  X 0") +
(1  )(1  )

X

+ (1  )(L  "):
Substituting for  and setting the two payo¤s equal to one another leads
to (25). Note that the equality is consistent with "() < 1 only if  is not
too small.
Finally, we prove that "() > (), where the latter is as dened in
proposition 1. From (23) and (25), X 0" = L and "() = () when " = 0.
Now, from (25), "() is increasing in ". It is also increasing in X 0" since
@"()
@X 0"
=
f(X 0") (X
0
"   L)
(1  )(L X)
and X 0" > L when " > 0. The two results together imply "() > () as
claimed.
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